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This article discusses legislative and judicial developments relating to
the Texas law of intestacy, wills, estate administration, trusts, and other
estate planning matters during the Survey period of December 1, 2016
through November 30, 2017. The reader is warned that not all newly
enacted statutes or decided cases during the Survey period are presented,
and not all aspects of each statute or case are analyzed. You must read
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and study the full text of each statute or case before relying on it or using
it as precedent. The discussion of most cases includes a moral, that is, the
important lesson to be learned from the case. By recognizing situations
that resulted in time-consuming and costly litigation in the past, the
reader may be able to reduce the likelihood of the same situations arising
with his or her clients.
I. INTESTACY
A. EQUITABLE ADOPTION
Despite apparent clear statutory language to the contrary, the Texas
courts have consistently held that when a child adopted by estoppel dies,
the child’s property passes to the biological family rather than to the
adoptive family, as is the case when a formally adopted child dies.1 The
2017 Legislature changed the definition of “child” to expressly include an
equitably adopted child.2 The 2017 Legislature also added language to the
adoption statute to include equitably adopted children, which effectively
overrules this case.3
B. PASSAGE OF TITLE
If there is more than one heir, they each hold title to every asset as
tenants in common.4 For example, if three children inherit the property of
their last-to-die parent, each owns one-third of each item of clothing,
silverware, book, piece of furniture, etc. This, of course, can be extremely
awkward if the three children are unable to agree among themselves re-
garding who receives full ownership of each asset. If they cannot agree,
the item may be sold and proceeds divided proportionately. However, if
the estate is independently administered, the executor may make distri-
butions in divided or undivided interests in proportionate or dispropor-
tionate shares, and value the property to adjust the distribution for the
differences in value of the assets.5
The problems associated with heirs holding as tenants in common are
exacerbated with real property. The 2017 Texas Legislature addressed
two of these problems. First, the Legislature became the eighth state to
enact the Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act.6 Here is how the Uni-
form Law Commission describes the act:
[The act] helps preserve family wealth passed to the next generation
in the form of real property. Affluent families can engage in sophisti-
cated estate planning to ensure generational wealth, but those with
smaller estates are more likely to use a simple will or to die intestate.
For many lower- and middle-income families, the majority of the es-
1. See Heien v. Crabtree, 369 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. 1963).
2. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 22.004(a) (West Supp. 2017).
3. Id. § 201.054(e).
4. Id. § 201.003 (West 2014).
5. Id. § 405.0015.
6. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ch. 23A (West Supp. 2017).
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tate consists of real property. If the landowner dies intestate, the real
estate passes to the landowner’s heirs as tenants-in-common under
state law. Tenants-in-common are vulnerable because any individual
tenant can force a partition. Too often, real estate speculators ac-
quire a small share of heirs’ property in order to file a partition ac-
tion and force a sale. Using this tactic, an investor can acquire the
entire parcel for a price well below its fair market value and deplete
a family’s inherited wealth in the process. UPHPA provides a series
of simple due-process protections: notice, appraisal, right-of first-re-
fusal, and if the other co-tenants choose not to exercise their right
and a sale is required, a commercially reasonable sale supervised by
the court to ensure all parties receive their fair share of the
proceeds.7
Second, the Legislature changed the common law by providing that,
under certain circumstances, a co-heir may adversely possess property
owned by the other co-heirs.8 To apply, there must be an uninterrupted
ten-year period of adverse possession followed by another five years after
affidavits of heirship and adverse possession are filed.9 Then, notice must
be published in the county where the property is located and written no-
tice must be sent to the last known address of all the co-heirs by certified
mail.10 Title will then vest in the co-heir unless another co-heir files a
controverting affidavit or brings suit to recover the co-tenant’s share
within five years of the date of the filing of the affidavits.11
II. WILLS
A. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
Texas Capital Bank v. Asche12 demonstrates that once a jury deter-
mines a testator’s capacity to execute a will, it will be difficult to have that
finding overturned on appeal unless the jury’s finding is against the great
weight of the evidence. In the case, the trial court determined that the
testator lacked capacity to execute multiple estate-planning documents
spanning over a decade.13 In addition, the trial court found that the testa-
tor was subjected to undue influence.14
The Dallas Court of Appeals made an exhaustive review of the evi-
dence, which included both medical and lay testimony.15 Although there
was “unquestionably conflicting evidence” about the testator’s capacity,
7. Partition of Heirs Property Act, UNIFORM L. COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws
.org/Act.aspx?title=Partition%20of%20Heirs%20Property%20Act (last visited Feb. 6,
2018) [https://perma.cc/2JFX-JWRP].
8. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.0265(b) (West Supp. 2017).
9. Id. § 16.0265(e).
10. Id. § 16.0265(c)(2)–(3).
11. Id. § 16.0265(f).
12. No. 05-15-00102-CV, 2017 WL 655923 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 17, 2017, pet.
dism’d) (mem op.).
13. Id. at *5.
14. Id.
15. Id. at *6–10.
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the court explained that it may not substitute its judgment for that of the
jury.16 The court then concluded that the evidence was legally and factu-
ally sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the testator lacked capac-
ity.17 Accordingly, the court of appeals did not need to address the undue
influence issue.18
B. SELF-PROVING AFFIDAVIT
The self-proving affidavit was revised to change the phrases “last will
and testament” and “last will or testament” to “will” to reflect modern
law which no longer maintains the common law distinction that wills were
for real property and testaments were for personal property.19
C. ADEMPTION
Boothe v. Green20 shows that a testatrix making a specific devise should
expressly explain the testatrix’s intent if a division of surface and subsur-
face rights later occurs. In Boothe, the testatrix devised all of her “farm
lands” and “pasture lands” to her three grandchildren.21 The remainder
of her estate was to pass to one of these grandchildren.22 The testatrix
then sold the land and, at the same time, received back from the pur-
chaser an undivided one-half interest in the property’s mineral interests.23
A dispute arose between the heirs of the original devisees about whether
the mineral interests passed under the grant of farm and pasture land or
the original devise adeemed so that the minerals belonged solely to the
heirs of the remainder grandchild.24 The trial court held ademption
occurred.25
The Corpus Christi-Edinburg Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
total ademption did not occur.26 Instead, ademption operated only pro
tanto.27 The mineral interest was part of the original devise that included
both surface and mineral rights of the farm and pasture land.28 Thus, the
heirs of the three specific devisees are entitled to the mineral interest
“leftover” from the original devise.29
16. Id. at *16.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 251.104(e) (West Supp. 2017). Note that many other statu-
tory references in the Estates Code were likewise updated.
20. 534 S.W.3d 93 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2017, pet. filed).




25. Id. at 95.
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D. WILL REFORMATION
The 2015 Legislature authorized courts to modify or reform a will even
if the will is unambiguous but placed no time limit on that authority, cre-
ating the possibility that wills admitted to probate decades ago could be
modified or reformed.30 The Legislature now requires the action to be
filed on or before the fourth anniversary of the date the will was admitted
to probate.31
E. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
Straightforward estate planning strategies may reduce the need for
resolving cases that use archaic techniques such as joint wills. For exam-
ple, in Jinkins v. Jinkins,32 a dispute arose between full and half-siblings
over the ownership of certain land. The full siblings claimed that, upon
their mother’s death, the property passed into a trust that was solely for
their benefit.33 The half siblings (children of the step-mother) claimed
that the property was owned by their father (the father of all the siblings)
until his death fifty years later and passed to all siblings equally under the
terms of his will.34 The trial court examined the documents and the com-
plex transactions that occurred for over half a century and concluded that
the disputed property passed under the father’s will to all four of his chil-
dren equally.35 The full siblings appealed.36
The First Houston Court of Appeals reversed.37 The court explained
that the property indeed passed into the trust when the full siblings’
mother died and thus the property belonged solely to them.38 To reach
this result, the court had to engage in some very sophisticated estate and
future interest discussion, which will demonstrate to readers that the time
they spent on these issues in law school is important and not merely an
academic exercise.39
The disputed property was originally held in the paternal grandparents’
trust.40 The father was the remainder beneficiary of this trust.41 The joint
will of the full siblings’ mother allegedly transferred this property into the
trust before the last grandparent died.42 The court of appeals determined
that the remainder interest was vested (father was born, ascertained, and
no conditions precedent existed to his taking other than the natural expi-
30. See Act of June 18, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 949, § 19, 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
ch. 949 (amended 2017) (current version at TEX. EST. CODE § 255.451).
31. TEX. EST. CODE § 255.451(a-1) (West Supp. 2017).
32. 522 S.W.3d 771 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
33. Id. at 775.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 778.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 786.
38. Id. at 780–84.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 781.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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ration of the life estate) and thus was transferable.43
The court of appeals next examined the joint will to determine if it
transferred the remainder interest of the surviving spouse (the father)
into the trust. The plain language of the joint will provided that upon the
death of the first to die (the mother of the full siblings), all property sub-
ject to disposition by the surviving spouse (the father) would pass into the
trust. Since the father’s remainder interest was transferable, it passed into
the trust solely for the benefit of the full siblings.44
The court of appeals also rejected other more tenuous arguments of the
half siblings such as the father’s will revoked the irrevocable trust, the
father had transferred property out of the trust so that it was no longer
governed by the trust’s terms, the half siblings were entitled to share as
pretermitted children despite being express beneficiaries of the father’s
will, and the applicability of the two-year will contest statute of limita-
tions barred the action.45
F. POSTHUMOUS CLASS GIFT MEMBERSHIP
The Legislature fixed a glitch in the 2015 statute that limited class gift
membership to members born or in gestation at the time of the testator’s
death.46 The statute originally made no distinction between immediate
gifts (“to my grandchildren”) and postponed gifts (“to my child for life
and then to my grandchildren”).47 In the latter case, it is like the testator
intended grandchildren born after the testator’s death to be included in
the gift.48 The clarification provides that the beneficiary must be alive or
in gestation at the death of the person by whom the class is measured
rather than the testator.49
G. WILL CONTESTS
1. Undue Influence—Sufficient Evidence
Overturning a jury verdict of undue influence is difficult and thus the
proponent must make a vigorous defense of the claim at trial. For exam-
ple, in Estate of Rodriguez,50 the jury determined the testator executed a
will and deed under undue influence.51 The Corpus Christi-Edinburg
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence was legally suffi-
cient to support the jury’s verdict.52 For example, the alleged undue influ-
43. Id.
44. Id. at 782–83.
45. Id. at 782–84.
46. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 255.401 (West Supp. 2017).
47. Act of May 30, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 949, § 19, 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch.
949 (S.B. 995) (amended 2017) (current version at TEX. EST. CODE § 255.401).
48. See id.
49. See TEX. EST. CODE § 255.401(a-1).
50. No. 13-16-00091-CV, 2017 WL 1228905 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi, Mar. 2, 2017,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
51. Id. at *2.
52. Id. at *6.
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encer lived with the testator, used the testator’s funds to pay personal
expenses, was present when the testator executed the documents, and
those documents favored one child while excluding seven others.53 While
none of these factors alone was necessarily dispositive, taken together
they were sufficient to support a finding of undue influence.54
2. Arbitration
Once a litigant agrees to settle a will contest case, the litigant should
not try to interfere with its later enforcement of the settlement merely
because of “settlement remorse.” For example, in Lawson v. Collins,55
the eleven children of the decedent had differing opinions regarding the
validity of their mother’s will. Some asserted that the will was valid while
others claimed that the mother lacked capacity or that she was subject to
fraud or undue influence when she executed the will.56 The children ac-
tively involved in the litigation signed a Rule 11 Mediated Settlement
Agreement.57 This Agreement provided for binding arbitration if dis-
putes under the Agreement later arose.58 Disputes did arise and the arbi-
tration concluded.59 One of the children who was not previously involved
with the litigation or settlement agreement then filed suit to contest the
will.60 After the trial court granted a summary judgment against her, one
of the children who agreed to the settlement opposed confirmation of the
award and was joined by her unsuccessful sibling.61 The trial court re-
jected the opposition and signed an order confirming the award and or-
dering that it be enforced according to its terms.62 The child who initially
agreed to the settlement appealed.63
The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed.64 The court of appeals first ad-
dressed the child’s claim that she was coerced by the mediator to agree to
the settlement.65 The court of appeals agreed that the trial court was not
in error for not allowing a hearsay affidavit in support of her coercion
claim.66 The court of appeals also agreed that it was permissible for the
trial court to exclude a hearsay medical report showing that the child
lacked the mental capacity to enter into the agreement.67 The court of
appeals held that it did not matter that she did not sign the settlement
53. Id. at *4–6.
54. Id. at *6.
55. No. 03-17-00003-CV, 2017 WL 4228728 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 20, 2017, no pet.)
(mem op.).
56. Id. at *1.
57. Id.
58. Id. at *2.





64. Id. at *8.
65. Id. at *4.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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agreement because the arbitration award is final once the arbitrator signs
it; there is no requirement that the parties sign it as well.68 The court of
appeals also rejected a multitude of other creative, but ineffective,
arguments.69
H. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH INHERITANCE RIGHTS
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the controversial issue of whether
Texas recognizes a cause of action for tortious interference with inheri-
tance rights in Kinsel v. Lindsey.70 A jury found that the defendants were
liable for tortiously interfering with the plaintiff’s inheritance rights.71
The trial court then awarded damages as well as other remedies in an
attempt to undo the interference.72 The defendants appealed not on the
ground that their conduct was not tortious, but rather that the tort is not
recognized as a cause of action.73
The Amarillo Court of Appeals agreed and reversed.74 The court of
appeals based its holding on the fact that neither the Supreme Court of
Texas nor the Fort Worth Court of Appeals had expressly recognized the
tort.75 A strong dissent pointed out that six of the Texas intermediate
appellate courts have recognized the tort, including the Amarillo court.76
In addition, six other courts, including the Fort Worth court, have dis-
cussed the tort without rejecting it.77
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed.78 The supreme court reviewed the
prior cases and explained that they did not show that the supreme court
had previously recognized the tort.79 Admitting some lower courts of ap-
peal have recognized the tort, the supreme court declined to recognize
the tort because the plaintiffs already had an adequate remedy—a con-
structive trust—imposed on the disputed inheritance, and thus the su-
preme court was “not persuaded to consider it here.”80 Accordingly, the
issue remains open and litigators will need to wait for another case to
reach the supreme court to ascertain whether tortious interference with
inheritance rights is a viable cause of action in Texas.
68. Id. at *5.
69. See id. at *5–8.
70. 526 S.W.3d 411 (Tex. 2017).
71. Id. at 418.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Jackson Walker, LLP v. Kinsel, 518 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo, Apr. 10,
2015), aff’d, Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411 (Tex. 2017).
75. See 518 S.W.3d at 10.
76. Id. at 30–33.
77. See id.
78. See Kinsel, 526 S.W.3d at 428.
79. Id. at 422–24.
80. Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
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I. WILL DEPOSIT
A person who has possession of a testator’s original will and who can-
not locate the testator after making a diligent search may deposit the will
for a five dollar fee with the county clerk of the county of the testator’s
last known residence.81 This provision solves the problem of what some-
one, especially an attorney, should do with an original will when the per-
son does not know how to locate the testator or even if the testator is still




Applications to probate a will with an administration or as a muniment
of title and applications for letters of administration must now contain the
last three numbers of the driver’s license numbers and social security
numbers of both the decedent (if known or ascertainable with reasonable
diligence) and the applicant.84
B. VENUE
The venue provision for probating a will and granting of letters was
amended to clarify how “next of kin” is defined when venue is based on
their residence when the decedent died outside of Texas.85 Basically, a
spouse is the closest next of kin with others within the third degree by
blood being determined by the normal intestacy order.86
C. TIME FOR PROBATE
The Legislature clarified that it is the application for probate that must
be filed within four years of the testator’s death to open an estate admin-
istration rather than the will actually being admitted to probate within
that time period.87
D. MUNIMENT OF TITLE
The requirements for the application for the probate of a will as a mu-
niment of title and required proof were made consistent with the situa-
tions where a muniment is authorized by allowing the application and
proof to explain another reason why there is no necessity for administra-
tion besides the testator’s estate not owing unpaid debts other than those
81. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 252.001(a-1) (West Supp. 2017).
82. Id.
83. Id. § 252.2015.
84. Id. §§ 256.052(a), 257.051(a), 301.052(a).
85. Id. § 33.001(b).
86. See id.
87. Id. § 256.003(b).
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secured by a lien on real property.88
E. LATE PROBATE
1. Default
In Ferreira v. Butler,89 the executrix of the decedent’s estate attempted
to probate the will of the decedent’s wife nine years after her death. The
wife’s children from a previous relationship contested the application by
asserting it was too late to probate the wife’s will as more than four years
had elapsed since the wife’s death.90 The executrix responded that the
four-year rule did not apply under Texas Estates Code Section 256.003
because she was not in default; she applied to probate the will a mere one
month after discovering the will.91 The trial court denied probate and the
executrix appealed.92
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals affirmed.93 The court of ap-
peals explained that the executrix’s timely conduct was irrelevant.94 The
important issue is whether the decedent acted timely, which he clearly did
not.95 The court of appeals explained that the executrix, both in her per-
sonal capacity and in her representative capacity, had no greater right
than the decedent had when he died.96
The court of appeals did, however, recognize there is a split in author-
ity in Texas regarding whether a default by a will beneficiary is attributed
to that beneficiary’s successors in interest (heirs or will beneficiaries).97
In determining which position to follow, the court of appeals looked to a
1940 Dallas Court of Appeal case98 that barred successors in interest “be-
cause the Supreme Court of Texas adopted that opinion and judgment by
refusing a writ of error.”99
2. Service of Process
Byerley v. McCulley100 held that applicants for a late probate need to
provide notice to the heirs regardless of when the testator died. The pro-
bate court admitted the testatrix’s will to probate nineteen years after her
death.101 The probate court determined the applicant was not in default
88. Id. §§ 257.051(a)(10), 257.054(5).
89. 531 S.W.3d 337 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. filed).
90. Id. at 338.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 344–45.
94. Id. at 341.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 341–45.
97. Id. at 342 (comparing In re Estate of Campbell, 343 S.W.3d 899, 905–08 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.) (default of beneficiary did not bar successors in interest)
with Schindler v. Schindler, 119 S.W.3d 923, 929 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied)
(default of beneficiary barred successors in interest)).
98. Faris v. Faris, 138 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1940, writ ref’d).
99. Ferreira, 531 S.W.3d at 343.
100. 514 S.W.3d 426, 428–30 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, no pet.).
101. Id. at 427.
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for probating the will within four years of the date of the testatrix’s death
and that service was made by posting.102 An heir sought a bill of review
asserting that he did not receive sufficient notice.103
The Tyler Court of Appeals agreed and granted the bill of review.104
The applicant claimed that, under the law at the time of the testatrix’s
death, service for a late probate by posting was sufficient.105 The heir
asserted that the law applicable when the applicant filed the will for pro-
bate governs, which requires service on heirs whose addresses can be as-
certained with reasonable diligence.106
The court of appeals recognized that when the law was changed to re-
quire service in 1999, the legislation contained a savings clause providing
that the change to require service on the heirs upon a late probate ap-
plied only if the person died on or after September 1, 1999.107 However,
when Probate Code Section 128B was repealed and replaced by Texas
Estates Code Section 258.001, there was no express savings clause.108 Be-
cause there was no savings clause and the text of Section 258.001 does not
limit the applicability of the notice requirements, notice to the heirs was
required.109 Accordingly, admitting the will to probate after only notice
by posting was a substantial error justifying the issuance of a bill of
review.110
F. NOTICE TO CREDITORS
Previously, a personal representative had to provide notice to creditors
by publication in a newspaper printed in the county where the letters
were issued. This caused difficulty in compliance as many newspapers are
physically printed in a county different from where they are distributed.
To solve this problem, the Legislature authorized publication in a news-
paper “of general circulation” in the county where letters were issued.111
G. AFFIDAVIT IN LIEU OF INVENTORY
The 2011 Legislature authorized an independent executor to file an af-
fidavit in lieu of the inventory, appraisement, and list of claims if no debts
other than secured debts, taxes, and administration expenses remain by
the inventory due date.112 This procedure keeps the decedent’s property
from being listed on the public record and thus helps with privacy con-
cerns.113 However, the executor must still prepare a sworn inventory and
102. Id.
103. Id. at 427–28.
104. Id. at 430.
105. Id. at 428.
106. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 258.001 (West 2014).
107. Byerley, 514 S.W.3d at 429.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 430.
111. TEX. EST. CODE § 308.051(a) (West Supp. 2017).
112. Id. § 309.056 (West 2014).
113. See id.
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provide a copy to each beneficiary unless an exception exists.114 The 2017
Legislature authorized the court to fine the executor up to $1,000 if the
executor misrepresents that all required beneficiaries received the
inventory.115
H. E-MAIL ACCESS
In re Cokinos, Boisien & Young116 shows that an attorney may find it
prudent to keep paper copies of documents relating to fees so that the
attorney’s executor can have unfettered access to them. The trial court
ordered a law firm to turn over to an attorney’s executor e-mails between
the attorney and the firm concerning a lawsuit that may be relevant to a
fee-sharing dispute between the attorney and the law firm.117 The order
included a protective order to preserve potentially confidential and privi-
leged communications.118 The law firm petitioned for a writ of mandamus
to prevent enforcement of the judge’s disclosure order.119
The Dallas Court of Appeals denied the petition.120 The court of ap-
peals explained that the executor had a duty to collect all debts due the
estate and the e-mails were relevant to the claim for fees against the law
firm.121 If the attorney were alive, the attorney would have had access to
the e-mails and thus so would the executor.122 Note that the court of ap-
peals did not address whether any specific document might be privileged
or subject to the attorney-client work product doctrine.123
I. DISTRIBUTIONS BY INDEPENDENT EXECUTORS
Independent executors now have much greater leeway in distributing
residuary property. Instead of giving each beneficiary an undivided share
in every asset, the executor may make distributions in divided or undi-
vided interests in proportionate or disproportionate shares, and value the
property to adjust the distribution for the differences in value of the
assets.124
J. ACCOUNTINGS
Under prior law, the personal representative in a dependent adminis-
tration was required to file the annual accounting by the end of the first
114. See id.
115. Id. § 309.0575(a) (West Supp. 2017).
116. 523 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.).
117. Id. at 902–03.
118. Id. at 903.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 904.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. The court decided this case before the newly enacted Texas Revised Uniform
Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act became effective.
124. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 405.0015 (West Supp. 2017).
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and subsequent years after receiving letters.125 This was virtually impossi-
ble to do because there was no lead time from the end of the year to
when the accounting was due.126 Now, the personal representative has
sixty days from the end of a year to file the accounting.127
K. FINAL SETTLEMENT
The dependent personal representative’s final settlement no longer
need show that all inheritance taxes have been paid because Texas no
longer has an inheritance tax.128
L. SMALL ESTATE AFFIDAVIT
The maximum value of an intestate estate (excluding homestead and
exempt property) eligible to use the small estate affidavit procedure was
raised to $75,000 from $50,000.129
M. LAWYER TRUST ACCOUNTS
The 2015 Legislature added Chapter 456 to address what happens to
trust and escrow accounts when an attorney dies. The 2017 Legislature
updated these provisions in two regards. First, after receiving the appro-
priate instructions regarding the distribution of the funds, the financial
institution must comply within seven business days (previously it was “a
reasonable time”).130 Second, any person aggrieved by the financial insti-
tution’s failure to distribute funds timely may now bring a private cause
of action against the institution.131
N. RECEIVER APPOINTMENT
In proper cases, the appointment of a receiver during a will contest is a
prudent move to preserve the status quo of the testator’s property until
the merits of the case are resolved. For example, in Estate of Price,132
after the death of the famous country music legend Ray Price, his wife
and son filed competing motions to probate wills and to contest each
other’s proposed will.133 The trial court appointed a receiver to take pos-
session of the property subject to the will contests.134 His wife asserted
the trial court abused its discretion in so doing and appealed.135
The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the decision to
125. See Act effective Jan. 1, 2014, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 680, § 1, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws
1689–90 (amended 2017) (current version at TEX. EST. CODE § 359.001).
126. See generally id.
127. TEX. EST. CODE §§ 359.001(a), 359.002(a) (West Supp. 2017).
128. Id. § 362.010, repealed by Act of May 28, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 844, § 38.
129. Id. § 205.001(3).
130. Id. § 456.003.
131. Id. § 456.0045(a).
132. 528 S.W.3d 591 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.).
133. Id. at 592.
134. Id.
135. Id.
2018] Wills & Trusts 465
appoint a receiver was not an abuse of discretion.136 The court of appeals
began its analysis with Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section
64.001, which allows a court to appoint a receiver in an action between
two parties who are jointly interested in the same property.137 Although
it is true that the appointment of a receiver is a harsh, drastic, and ex-
traordinary remedy, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ap-
pointing a receiver in this case.138 There was sufficient evidence that the
son had an interest in the property and the property was in danger of
being lost, removed, or materially injured.139
IV. TRUSTS
A. JURISDICTION
Lee v. Lee140 teaches that a statutory probate court has concurrent ju-
risdiction with the district court over both inter vivos and testamentary
trusts irrespective of whether any probate matter regarding the trust is
pending in the statutory probate court. In Lee, the beneficiaries sued in a
statutory probate court to remove the trustee.141 The trustee claimed that
the court lacked jurisdiction and suit should have been brought in district
court under Trust Code Section 115.001.142 The trustee admitted that the
statutory probate court has concurrent jurisdiction over testamentary
trusts but asserted that this jurisdiction is restricted to when a probate
proceeding is actually pending in the statutory probate court.143
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals disagreed with the trus-
tee.144 The court of appeals determined that the jurisdiction of statutory
probate courts is independent of its probate jurisdiction.145 “[T]he ab-
sence of a pending probate proceeding does not deprive a statutory pro-
bate court of its independent jurisdiction over testamentary-trust
actions.”146 The court of appeals also recognized that the statutory pro-
bate court has jurisdiction over inter vivos trusts as provided in Texas
Estates Code Section 32.006.147
B. REFORMATION
The 2015 Legislature granted the court broad authority to reform a will
in Estates Code Sections 255.451–255.455.148 The 2017 Legislature placed
136. Id. at 597.
137. Id. at 593.
138. Id. at 593–94.
139. Id. at 595.
140. 528 S.W.3d 201 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).
141. Id. at 206.
142. Id. at 211.
143. Id. at 211–12.
144. Id. at 213.
145. Id. at 212.
146. Id. at 213.
147. Id.
148. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 255.451–255.455 (West Supp. 2017).
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an equivalent provision in the Trust Code. A court may now reform a
trust if necessary or appropriate to (1) prevent waste or impairment of
the trust’s administration; (2) achieve tax objectives; (3) qualify a benefi-
ciary for governmental benefits; and (4) correct a scrivener’s error, even
if the trust is unambiguous, provided the settlor’s intent is established by
clear and convincing evidence.149
C. POSTHUMOUS CLASS GIFT MEMBERS
To be consistent with the Texas Estates Code provision on posthumous
class gift members, the Legislature amended the Trust Code to include a
parallel provision. Thus, a beneficiary must be alive or in gestation at the
death of the person by whom the class is measured unless the trust instru-
ment expressly provides otherwise.150
D. DIVORCE RAMIFICATIONS
The Legislature made several clarifications to the impact of divorce on
a trust. First, the divorce of a person who is not the settlor of a trust does
not trigger automatic revocation of provisions in favor of that person’s
former spouse or other ex-relatives.151 Second, if a married couple cre-
ates a joint revocable trust, divorce, and they do not divide the trust
before the first spouse dies, then the trust is divided into shares for each
settlor based on each spouse’s contributions to the trust.152 Then, the pro-
visions in favor of the ex-spouse and the ex-spouse’s relatives are ren-
dered ineffective with regard to the share created for the deceased spouse
unless a court order, express trust terms, or an applicable marital agree-
ment provides otherwise.153
E. FORFEITURE CLAUSES
The Legislature clarified the provision governing forfeiture clauses to
make it clear forfeiture clauses will “not be construed to prevent a benefi-
ciary from seeking to compel a fiduciary to perform the fiduciary’s duties,
seeking redress against a fiduciary for a breach of the fiduciary’s duties,
or seeking a judicial construction of a will or trust.”154
F. DISCLAIMERS
Disclaimers by trustees were simplified in several respects: (1) a trustee
does not need to give the attorney general notice of a disclaimer involv-
ing a charitable trust if the attorney general executes a written waiver,
and (2) a beneficiary is deemed to have waived notice if an authorized
person on behalf of an incapacitated beneficiary has received the dis-
149. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.054(b-1), (e), (f) (West Supp. 2017).
150. Id. § 112.011.
151. TEX. EST. CODE § 123.052(a) (West Supp. 2017).
152. See id. § 123.052(b).
153. Id. § 123.056.
154. TEX. PROP. CODE § 112.038 (West Supp. 2017).
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claimer notice.155
G. DELEGATION OF REAL PROPERTY POWERS
The Legislature expanded the ability of a trustee to delegate a wide
variety of powers to an agent by providing a non-exclusive laundry list of
powers so that an agent may deal with all aspects of a real property trans-
action.156 The trustee’s delegation must be in a writing that is properly
acknowledged.157 The agent’s authority only lasts six months and will end
sooner if the delegation contains an earlier date or the trustee dies, be-
comes incompetent, resigns, or is removed. The trustee remains responsi-
ble to the beneficiaries for all of the agent’s actions.158
H. DECANTING
The Legislature made several changes to the decanting provisions to
make this technique available in a greater number of situations than
when originally enacted in 2013. In addition, a clarification makes it clear
that merely because a court has authorized a trustee to decant does not
limit the ability of a beneficiary to sue the trustee for a breach of trust.159
I. INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS
The Texas Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act
originally provided that the Trust Code did not apply to certain charitable
funds held in trust form under the act. The 2017 Legislature revised this
provision to limit only the applicability of Chapter 116 (Uniform Princi-
pal and Income Act) and Chapter 117 (Uniform Prudent Investor
Act).160 The rest of the Trust Code now applies to these institutional
funds.
J. FIDUCIARY DUTY
Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.161 demonstrated that a beneficiary
should ascertain the theories behind a claim for breach of duty and plead
them in a timely manner. In Jones, the beneficiary sued the trustee for
breach of fiduciary duty in state court and the trustee removed the case to
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas.162 The district
court dismissed all of the beneficiary’s claims except for one, which arose
out of the trustee’s nonsuiting a case against an inspector for not compe-
tently performing a pre-purchase inspection of a house that the trust was
155. Id. § 240.0081(c), (d), (e-1).
156. Id. § 113.018(a), (b), (c).
157. Id. § 113.018(e).
158. Id. § 113.018(f).
159. Id. §§ 112.071, 112.072, 112.074(a), 112.078, 112.085.
160. Id. § 163.011.
161. 858 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 2017).
162. Id. at 931.
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purchasing for the beneficiary.163 The jury found that a breach occurred
but determined that the lawsuit had no value.164 However, the jury
awarded damages on a theory not pled, that is, that the trustee should
have nonsuited the case sooner once it became clear that the trustee
would not prevail against the inspector.165 The jury then awarded dam-
ages and the trustees appealed.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding in
favor of the trustees.166 The Fifth Circuit explained that, because the ben-
eficiary did not plead the claim and the trustee never consented to try the
unpled claim, it was improper for the court to award damages on the
theory that the trustee breached for not non-suiting the case earlier.167
The Fifth Circuit also affirmed the district court’s rejection of the benefi-
ciary’s other claims because they were barred by the Texas statute of limi-
tations on breach of fiduciary duty claims.168
K. TRUSTEE REMOVAL
Both current and remainder trust beneficiaries have standing to seek a
trustee’s removal. However, a beneficiary should not use removal actions
as a means of hassling the trustee when the trustee has not actually
breached fiduciary duties. For example, in Aubrey v. Aubrey,169 the re-
mainder beneficiary sought to remove the trustee for breach of fiduciary
duty and self-dealing.170 The trustee responded that the remainder bene-
ficiary had previously brought many lawsuits unsuccessfully against the
trustee and requested that the court deem the remainder beneficiary a
vexatious litigant and award sanctions.171 The trial court granted both re-
quests.172 The remainder beneficiary appealed.173
The Dallas Court of Appeals first rejected the trustee’s assertion that
the remainder beneficiary lacked standing to seek removal.174 The court
of appeals explained that a remainder beneficiary is a beneficiary and
thus has standing to seek the trustee’s removal as an interested person
under Trust Code Section 111.004, defining “interested person”; and
Trust Code Section 113.082, granting interested persons that right to peti-
tion for the removal of a trustee.175
Nonetheless, the facts were sufficient to support the trial court’s deter-
163. Id. at 931–32.
164. Id. at 932.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 936.
167. Id. at 933.
168. Id. at 934.
169. 523 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.).
170. Id. at 302.
171. Id. at 303.
172. Id. at 308.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 313.
175. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 111.004(7), 113.082(a) (West 2014))
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mination that the remainder beneficiary was a vexatious litigant.176 The
court agreed with the trustee that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion when it concluded that there was no reasonable probability that the
remainder beneficiary could prevail and that the other requirements for
vexatious litigant status were satisfied.177 Although the court of appeals
agreed that sanctions against the remainder beneficiary were warranted,
the court of appeals held the trial court abused its discretion in determin-
ing the amount of the award and thus remanded the determination of the
amount of sanctions to the trial court.178
V. OTHER ESTATE PLANNING MATTERS
A. ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS
Prudent professionals must address digital assets in all estates they plan
or administer. The 2017 Texas Legislature enacted the Texas Revised
Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (TRUFADAA) as Chap-
ter 2001 of the Texas Estates Code, which adds clarity to the steps to take
when planning and administering estates.179
1. Key Terms of Art
Digital assets are electronic records (think binary 1s and 0s) in which a
person has a right or interest. The term “digital asset” is a very broad
term which encompasses all electronically-stored information, including
(1) information stored on a user’s computer and other digital devices; (2)
content uploaded onto websites; (3) rights in digital property; and (4)
records that are either the catalogue or the content of an electronic com-
munication.180 Examples include (1) e-mails; (2) text messages; (3)
photos; (4) digital music and video; (5) word processing documents; (6)
social media accounts (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter); (7) online fi-
nancial, utility, credit card, and loan accounts; and (8) gaming avatars.
The term does not include an underlying asset or liability unless the asset
or liability is itself an electronic record.181
A fiduciary means a personal representative of an estate (executor or
administrator), an agent under a non-medical power of attorney, a guard-
ian of an estate, and a trustee of a trust.182 This article summarizes
TRUFADAA’s impact on personal representatives and trustees. The
Act’s application to agents and guardians are beyond the scope of this
article.183
176. Id. at 315.
177. Id. at 314–15.
178. Id. at 320.
179. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. ch. 2001 (West Supp. 2017).
180. Id. § 2001.002(8).
181. Id.
182. Id. § 2001.002(12).
183. For a detailed discussion, see Gerry W. Beyer & Kerri G. Nipp, Cyber Estate Plan-
ning and Administration, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2166422 (last
updated Aug. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5H7Q-9QQB].
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A user is a person who has an account dealing with digital assets.184 In
this context, the user would be the decedent, principal, ward, or
trustee.185
The custodian is the person who carries, maintains, processes, receives,
or stores a digital asset (e.g., the user’s e-mail provider such as Yahoo,
Google, or Suddenlink; the hosts of the user’s social media accounts such
as Facebook or LinkedIn; and the user’s financial accounts maintained
on-line in banks, brokerage firms, utility providers, credit card issuers,
and mortgage companies).186
2. Reasons Fiduciary Desires Access to Digital Assets
There are many reasons why a fiduciary would desire access to the
user’s digital assets.187
(1) Many people forego paper statements for financial accounts such
as bank accounts, retirement accounts, and brokerage accounts.188
A personal representative may seek access to the contents of the
decedent’s e-mail messages to ascertain where these accounts are
located and to gain the information necessary to complete the es-
tate inventory, pay bills, and distribute the funds appropriately.189
Likewise, an agent or guardian may need this information for simi-
lar purposes.190
(2) Many people forego paper statements for utilities, credit cards, car
loans, and home mortgages.191 The fiduciary may need to give no-
tice to and pay these creditors and thus needs access to e-mail
messages to determine the names of the creditors and the amounts
owed.192
(3) Some digital assets like domain names, customer lists, manuscripts,
and compositions may have significant economic value.193 The per-
sonal representative needs access to these assets for management,
inventory, and distribution purposes.194
(4) Some digital assets like family photos and videos do not have mon-
etary value but they have great sentimental value and need to be
preserved or transferred to the proper heirs or beneficiaries.195
184. TEX. EST. CODE § 2001.002(24).
185. Id.
186. Id. § 2001.002(6).
187. Beyer & Nipp, supra note 183, at 3.
188. Beyer & Nipp, supra note 183, at 2.
189. Beyer & Nipp, supra note 183, at 3.
190. Beyer & Nipp, supra note 183, at 3.
191. Beyer & Nipp, supra note 183, at 2.
192. Beyer & Nipp, supra note 183, at 3.
193. Beyer & Nipp, supra note 183, at 2, 4.
194. Beyer & Nipp, supra note 183, at 3.
195. Beyer & Nipp, supra note 183, at 4.
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3. Effective Date
TRUFADAA applies to a fiduciary regardless of when the decedent
died, the power of attorney or will was executed, the guardianship com-
menced, or the trust was created.196
4. Access Priority
First priority is given to the user’s instructions using the custodian’s
online tool, that is, the custodian’s service that allows the user to provide
directions for disclosure (or nondisclosure) of digital assets to a third per-
son.197 Examples include Google’s Inactive Account Manager and
Facebook’s Legacy Contact.
Second priority is given to the user’s instructions in the user’s will,
power of attorney, or trust.198 If the user has not provided instructions
through an online tool or other writing or electronic record, then the ser-
vice provider’s terms of service agreement (the “I agree” button) will
govern the rights of the decedent’s personal representative.199 Typically,
these provisions will prohibit access by third parties.200
5. Types of Access
There is a major difference between the two types of access.201 The first
type is access to the contents of electronic communications, which refers
to the substance or meaning of the communication such as the subject
line and text of e-mail messages.202
The second type of access encompasses both the catalogue of electronic
communications (e.g., the name of sender, the e-mail address of the
sender, and the date and time of the message but not the subject line or
the content) and other digital assets (e.g., photos, videos, material stored
on the user’s computer, etc.).203
6. Impact on Will Drafting
Digital assets need to be addressed from two perspectives. First, if the
person owns any digital assets that are transferable upon death, the per-
son may wish to make a gift of the asset to a named person.204 If not, they
will pass under the residuary clause.205
Second, the person needs to determine if the person wants the executor
to read the substance of email messages, texts, and private social media
196. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. ch. 2001 (West Supp. 2017).
197. Id. § 2001.051(a).
198. Id. § 2001.051(b).
199. Beyer & Nipp, supra note 183, at 5.
200. Beyer & Nipp, supra note 183, at 5
201. Beyer & Nipp, supra note 183, at 11.
202. Beyer & Nipp, supra note 183, at 11.
203. Beyer & Nipp, supra note 183, at 11.
204. Beyer & Nipp, supra note 183, at 18.
205. Beyer & Nipp, supra note 183, at 18.
472 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 4
postings.206 If yes, then express language granting access must be in-
cluded in the will.207
7. Personal Representative Access to the Contents of the Decedent’s
Electronic Communications?
If a deceased user consented in the user’s will, a custodian must dis-
close the contents of electronic communications to the personal represen-
tative of a deceased user’s estate if the representative provides:
• a written request for disclosure;
• a certified copy of the deceased user’s death certificate;
• a certified copy of letters testamentary or letters of appointment
proving the representative’s authority; and
• a copy of the documentation (typically, the will) in which the user
consented to the disclosure of the content of electronic communica-
tions specifically (if not so provided pursuant to an online tool).208
Before complying with the request, the custodian has the right to re-
quest additional information such as:
• information necessary to identify the user’s account;
• evidence linking such account to the user; and
• a finding by the court that the account actually belonged to the dece-
dent, the disclosure of the contents would not violate the Stored
Communications Act and other federal laws, the user consented to
disclosure, disclosure is permitted by TRUFADAA, and disclosure is
reasonably necessary for estate administration.209
If the deceased user did not consent to the disclosure of contents (e.g.,
no express language in the will or died intestate), the executor will not be
able to obtain access to the contents.
8. Personal Representative Access to the Catalogue of Decedent’s
Electronic Communications and Other Digital Assets
The requirements for a personal representative to gain access to the
catalogue and digital assets other than the content of electronic commu-
nications are less stringent. Unless prohibited by the user or court order,
the personal representative is granted access to the catalogue and digital
assets other than the content by default (upon providing the custodian
with the specified required documentation, which is basically the same as
is required to access contents except there is no requirement that the de-
cedent’s will be produced or that the decedent specifically consented to
disclosure).210
206. Beyer & Nipp, supra note 183, at 18.
207. Beyer & Nipp, supra note 183, at 18.
208. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 2001.101(a) (West Supp. 2017).
209. Id. § 2001.101(b).
210. Id. § 2001.102.
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The ability of a custodian to request a court order under any circum-
stance makes access very burdensome for personal representatives as well
as the courts. This author has heard from representatives of Google and
Facebook that they will always require a court order. The reason behind
this is these companies want the security of a court order before releasing
any information for fear of liability for improper disclosure.
Because of the likelihood that a custodian will require a court order
before granting access, include the appropriate language in the earliest
possible pleading in the administration of the estate of a deceased user
such as the application for an independent administration, determination
of heirship, or admission of a will as a muniment of title. (Note: It is
uncertain how judges will react to being asked to make these findings in
these proceedings.)
9. Trustee Access
If the trustee is the original user, meaning that the trustee, in his or her
capacity as the trustee, opened an online account or procured a digital
asset, then the custodian must provide the trustee with all content, cata-
logues, and digital assets of the trust.211
If the trustee is not the original user (for example, a settlor has a digital
asset and then transfers it to a trust, either during life or at death), then
different rules apply based on whether the trustee is requesting content
or non-content material.
Upon receiving the specified required documentation, including a certi-
fied copy of the trust agreement that grants disclosure of the content spe-
cifically and a certification by the trustee under penalty of perjury that
the trust exists and the trustee is currently serving as the trustee, a custo-
dian must disclose to a trustee the content of electronic communications
unless otherwise directed by the user, provided for in the trust agreement,
or ordered by the court.212
When the trustee is not the original user, a custodian (upon receiving
the specified required documentation) must disclose to a trustee the cata-
logue and all digital assets other than the content unless otherwise di-
rected by the user, provided for in the trust agreement, or ordered by the
court.213
In both cases, the custodian may request additional information such as
a number, user name, address, or other unique subscriber or account
identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the trust’s account or evi-
dence which links the account to the trust.
211. Id. § 2001.151.
212. Id. § 2001.152.
213. Id. § 2001.153.
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10. Custodian Compliance
The custodian must comply with a request to disclose not later than
sixty days after receipt of a proper request along with the required
documentation.214
When a custodian discloses digital assets, the custodian may at its sole
discretion:
• grant the fiduciary full access to the user’s account;
• limit access to that which is sufficient for the fiduciary’s performance
of designated tasks;
• provide the fiduciary with a paper or digital copy of a digital asset;
• assess a reasonable administrative charge for disclosing digital assets;
• withhold an asset deleted by a user; or
• make the determination that a request imposes an undue burden on
the custodian, and if necessary, petition the court for an order.215
The comments to the Uniform Act acknowledge that each custodian
has a different business model, and some may prefer one method for dis-
closure over another. An example of the type of situation that is preemp-
tively addressed by allowing the custodian to claim that a request imposes
an undue burden is where a fiduciary requests disclosure of “any email
pertaining to financial matters,” which would require the custodian to sift
through all emails and determine which ones were relevant or irrele-
vant.216 In such event, the custodian may decline the fiduciary’s request,
and either the fiduciary or the custodian may request guidance from a
court.217
A custodian incurs no penalty for failing to disclose within sixty days of
a proper request. If the custodian does not disclose, the fiduciary may
apply to the court for an order directing compliance.218 This court order
must state that compliance is not in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2702.219 The
decedent’s estate, principal, ward, or trust bears all the expenses of seek-
ing and obtaining the court order such as attorney fees and court costs.
A custodian is immune from liability for disclosing or failing to disclose
if done in good faith.220 However, a custodian is likely to be liable if it
fails to comply with a valid court order.
B. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
The 2017 Legislature made extensive changes (the bill is 58 pages long)
to many aspects of durable power of attorney law.221 Below is a brief
214. Id. § 2001.231(a).
215. Id. § 2001.053.
216. REV. UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIG. ASSETS ACT § 6 cmt (Unif. Law Comm’n
2015).
217. Id.
218. TEX. EST. CODE § 2001.231(a) (West Supp. 2017).
219. Id.
220. Id. § 2001.232.
221. See id. §§ 752.001–.115.
2018] Wills & Trusts 475
summary of some of the key changes:
• The statutory form was extensively revised.222
• Co-agents are expressly allowed.223
• An agent is not a fiduciary until the agent accepts the appointment
and is actually serving as the agent.224
• An agent may be given the power to appoint a successor agent.225
• An agent is presumed to be entitled to reasonable compensation and
reimbursement of reasonable expenses.226
• The agent has expanded powers to create, amend, and revoke inter
vivos trusts, make gifts, and change beneficiary designations.227
• A co-agent with actual knowledge of a breach or imminent breach of
fiduciary duty by another agent has the duty to notify the principal of
the breach.228
• The agent has the duty to preserve the principal’s estate plan.229
• The appointment of a temporary guardian suspends the agent’s pow-
ers unless the court provides otherwise.230
• The rules regarding when a court may remove an agent are expanded
and clarified.231
• The individuals who may request a construction of a power of attor-
ney were expanded.232
• A copy of a power of attorney (physical or electronic) has the same
effect as the original.233
• Detailed provisions requiring third parties to accept the agent’s au-
thority along with options for third parties to refuse acceptance
under specified circumstances.234
• Under limited circumstances, the agent may bring a statutory cause
of action to force a third party to accept the agent’s authority.235
• Third parties, such as financial institutions, cannot require a durable
power of attorney to be on the institution’s form.236
• A third party who relies on the power of attorney may rely on a
presumption that the principal’s signature is genuine.237
222. Id. § 752.051.
223. Id. § 751.021.
224. Id. § 751.101.
225. Id. § 751.023(b).
226. Id. § 751.024 (but only if power executed on or after September 1, 2017).
227. Id. § 751.031(b) (Unless the power provides otherwise, an agent who is not an
ancestor, spouse, or descendant of the principal cannot exercise these powers in favor of
himself, herself, or anyone he or she has a legal obligation to support.).
228. Id. § 751.121(a).
229. Id. § 751.122.
230. Id. § 751.133(a).
231. Id. § 753.002.
232. Id. § 751.251.
233. Id. § 751.0023(c).
234. Id. § 751.201.
235. Id. § 751.213.
236. Id. § 751.202.
237. Id. §751.210.
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C. MEDICAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
The disclosure statement is no longer a separate document. Instead, it
is included within the medical power of attorney form itself.238
D. SELF-DESIGNATION OF GUARDIAN
If the self-designation of guardian does not disqualify anyone from
serving as a guardian, then the formalities are reduced—an acknowledge-
ment by a notary substitutes for the two witnesses and it is then consid-
ered self-proved if it contains the new acknowledgement language found
in the statute.239
E. MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT DECLARATION
The formalities for a declaration of mental health treatment were mod-
ernized. Instead of having two witnesses sign the declaration, it is now
permissible for the declarant to have the declaration notarized. The statu-
tory form was also updated to reflect this change.240
F. TRANSFER ON DEATH DEEDS
The 2017 Legislature clarified the Texasized version of the Uniform
Real Property Transfer on Death Act enacted in 2015 as Chapter 114 of
the Texas Estates Code by providing: (1) if a beneficiary fails to survive
the transferor by 120 hours (regardless of whether the beneficiary is a
sole or co-beneficiary) and the deed fails to provide otherwise, the bene-
ficiary’s share passes under the normal lapse rules of the Texas Estates
Code; and (2) more options for the transferor to select regarding how the
property passes if one or more beneficiaries fails to survive.241
G. TRANSFER ON DEATH MOTOR VEHICLES
The 2017 Legislature added Chapter 115 to the Texas Estates Code to
allow the owners of a motor vehicle to name a beneficiary who will own
the vehicle upon the owner’s death (co-beneficiaries are not allowed).242
The designation is a revocable non-testamentary transfer and cannot be
changed by the owner’s will.243 If the vehicle is jointly owned with survi-
vorship rights, both co-owners must agree to the beneficiary designa-
tion.244 The beneficiary must apply for a transfer of the vehicle’s title
within 180 days of the owner’s death.245
238. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.164 (West Supp. 2017).
239. TEX. EST. CODE §§ 1104.203, 1104.204 (West Supp. 2017).
240. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 137.003(a), 137.011 (West Supp. 2017).
241. TEX. EST. CODE §§ 114.103, 114.151.
242. See id. §§ 115.001–.006.
243. Id. § 115.002.
244. Id. § 115.003.
245. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 501.0315(c) (West Supp. 2017).
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H. MULTIPLE PARTY ACCOUNTS
1. Survivorship Rights
The signature card in Hare v. Longstreet246 contained an “X” in a box
labeled “MULTIPLE-PARTY ACCOUNT WITH RIGHT OF SURVI-
VORSHIP,” and both the deceased and surviving joint parties initialed
on the blank next to the box. Both the trial and appellate courts held that
this indication was insufficient to create survivorship rights in the surviv-
ing party.247
The Tyler Court of Appeals explained that the signature card lacked
language substantially similar to the language required by Texas Estates
Code Section113.151(b) (“On the death of one party to a joint account,
all sums in the account the date of the death vest in and belong to the
surviving party as his or her separate property and estate.”).248 Merely
stating that the account has the right of survivorship is insufficient to
make it so.249
This author believes that most lay people would assume that checking
the box next to a phrase saying “with right of survivorship” would be
sufficient to create survivorship rights. Thus, estate attorneys must have
“eyes-on” all signature cards and account contracts to ascertain whether
the accounts of both their living and deceased clients actually have the
survivorship feature.
2. Form
The statutory Uniform Single-Party or Multiple-Party Account Selec-
tion Form Notice no longer requires the customer to initial to the right of
each paragraph, which was rarely done because the form had the blanks
to the left of some, but not all, of the paragraphs.250 Instead, the customer
now must merely sign a paragraph indicating that the customer read the
form and received disclosure of the ownership rights to the accounts.251
3. Ramifications of Divorce
An ex-spouse, as well as the ex-spouse’s relatives who are not also rela-
tives of the deceased spouse (for example former mothers-in-law), are
now prevented from taking under provisions of a joint account with survi-
vorship rights unless there has been a reaffirmation of the survivorship
agreement.252 Prior to this amendment, only ex-spouses and their rela-
tives named as P.O.D. or trust account beneficiaries were automatically
prevented from receiving the funds. The funds are distributed as if the ex-
spouse or ex-relative had predeceased the deceased joint account
246. 531 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, no pet.).
247. Id. at 928.
248. Id. at 925.
249. Id. at 928.
250. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 113.052 (West Supp. 2017).
251. Id. §§ 113.052, 113.053(a-1).
252. Id. § 123.151(b).
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holder.253 However, a financial institution is not liable for paying the
funds to the ex-spouse or the ex-spouse’s relative.254
4. Liability for Estate Taxes
A multiparty account is now liable for estate taxes caused by the inclu-
sion of that account in a decedent’s estate regardless of whether other
assets of the estate are sufficient to pay them.255
VI. CONCLUSION
The new statutes and cases address a wide array of issues, some very
narrow and some with potentially broad impact. This article has already
discussed the practical application of the statutes and cases. It is also im-
portant to understand some overarching principles that transcend individ-
ual statutes and cases, and forming a pattern. Here are some examples of
patterns this author detected:
• The Texas Legislature pushed Texas toward the modern age by up-
dating various statutes to include language and processes indicative
of common practices. The Texas Legislature also continues to
streamline processes and clarify current forms within statutes to cre-
ate a better process overall.
• The influence of digital assets was memorialized and will only con-
tinue to assert its dominance in estate planning as we become more
evolved with our use of technology.
• Texas courts continue to narrowly interpret jury decisions, which
makes pretrial matters and litigation even more important than they
already were.
253. Id. § 123.151(c-1).
254. Id. § 123.151(d-1).
255. Id. § 113.252.
